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Jones v. United States
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L Facts
Louis Jones, Jr. ("Jones") kidnaped Private Tracie Joy McBride
("McBride") at gunpoint from Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo,
Texas. Jones transported McBride to his house where he sexually assaulted
her. Next, Jones drove McBride to a bridge just outside of San Angelo.
Using a tire iron, Jones struck McBride in the head several times until she
died. The blows proved so severe that large pieces of McBride's skull were
either missing or had been driven into her cranial cavity.'
Jones was charged with kidnaping with death resulting to the victim in
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2).2 Exercising its discretion under the
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 ("FDPA"),3 the government sought the
death penalty. Jones was subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.4
Under the FDPA, the sentencing hearing is divided into an "eligibility"
phase and a "selection" phase.' Upon a requisite finding of intent, at least
one of the sixteen statutory aggravating factors set forth at 18 U.S.C S
3592(c) must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a defen-
dant to become death-eligible.6 The jury unanimously found beyond a
reasonable doubt that two statutory aggravating factors existed-causing
death during the commission of another crime and committing the offense
in an especially heinous, cruel, and depraved manner." In addition to the
two statutory aggravating factors on which the jury based the death eligibil-
ity determination, the jury found two non-statutory aggravating factors:
victim vulnerability and victim impact!
Once Jones became death eligible, the jury was required to decide
whether he should be sentenced to death. This selection phase decision
requires the jury to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating factors.
1. Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (1999).
2. 18 U.S.C. 5 1201 (1984).
3. 18 U.S.C. S 3591-3598 (1999).
4. Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 2096.
5. Id. See 18 U.S.C. S 3593.
6. Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 2096. See 18 U.S.C. S 3593(e).
7. Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 2096.
8. Idi at 2097 & n.2.
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The jury then determines whether the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating, or, if there are no mitigating fictors, whether the aggravating
factors alone are sufficient to impose a sentence of death. The jury found
that the two statutory aggravating factors and the two non-statutory aggra-
vating factors outweighed the twelve mitigating factors proposed by the
defense and unanimously recommended a death sentence. Consistent with
18 U.S.C. S 3594, the district court imposed the death sentence in accor-
dance with the jury's recommendation.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision.1" The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the following issues: (1) whether Jones was entitled to
an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock; (2) whether there was a
reasonable likelihood that the jury was led to believe that Jones would
receive a court-imposed sentence less than life without parole if it failed to
reach a unanimous sentence recommendation; and (3) whether the submis-
sion to the jury of two allegedly duplicative, vaue, and overbroad non-
statutory aggravating factors was harmless error.
IZ Holding
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision,
holding the following: (1) the Eighth Amendment does not require that
jurors be instructed as to the consequences of their failure to agree; (2) the
instructions and verdict forms, taken in full context, were unambiguous and
did not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury believed that a lack of
unanimity would cause the district court to impose a sentence less than life;
and (3) the non-statutory aggravating factors were constitutionally valid.12
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Entitlement to Instruction to the Jury on the Effect of Deadlock
Jones argued that the Eighth Amendment requires a jury instruction on
the consequences of a jury's failure to reach an agreement." In the alterna-
tive, Jones contended that the United States Supreme Court should exercise
its power over federal courts and require such an instruction to be issued.14
In order to pass constitutional muster under the Eighth Amendment,
a capital sentencing scheme must do two things. First, it must perform a
9. Id.
10. Id. See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998).
11. Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 2096.
12. Id. at 2099,2103-04,2107-10 (concluding the only possible error was one of drafting,
which was harmless).
13. Id. at 2097-98.
14. Id. at 2098.
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narrowing function as to the class of persons eligible to receive a death
sentence, the "eligibility phase.""5 Second, death sentences must be substan-
tiated by individualized inquiry in what is known as the "selection phase."
16
A valid individualized inquiry must permit a "broad inquiry" into "constitu-
tionally relevant .itigating evidence." "
The United States Supreme Court concluded that an instruction on the
consequences of deadlock has bearing on neither the eligibility phase nor the
jury's consideration of evidence during the selection phase. 8 Such an
instruction speaks only to what happens when a jury is unable to fulfill its
role in the sentencing process.19 Accordingly, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment does not require a jury to be instructed as to the effect
of a lack of unanimity."0
Likewise, the Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to
require the instruction.2 The Court pointed to the strong governmental
interest in having the jury express the "conscience of the community on
issues of life and death" that would be undermined by the issuance of the
proposed instruction." The Court also noted that the FDPA itself does not
require such an instruction.23 Furthermore, the Court cited Justus v. Com-
monwealt/9 ' as being a _particularly persuasive decision on the issue of
requiring an instruction. In Justus, the Supreme Court of Virginia admit-
ted that, while an instruction on the consequences of the jury's failure to
agree would be consistent with the law, such an instruction concerns merely
a procedural matter and, therefore, its issuance is not required. 6
However, Jones does not completely foreclose the possibility of obtain-
ing a jury instruction on the consequences of deadlock. Two recent non-
capital cases decided in Virginia lend support to defendants seeking such an
instruction. In Batts v. Commonwealth,"' the Virginia Court of Appeals
pointed out that the trial court's affirmative duty to provide juries with
15. Id. (citing Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998)).
16. Id. (citing Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275).
17. Id. (quoting Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 2099.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2098-99.
21. Id. at 2099.
22. Id. (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1998) (quoting Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968))).
23. Id. at 2099.
24. 266 S.E.2d 87 (Va. 1980).
25. Jones, 119 S.Ct. at 2099.
26. Justus v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 87, 92 (Va. 1980).
27. 515 S.E.2d 307 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
1999]
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correct statements of law is essential to a fair trial.28 Batts goes on to state
that the trial court also has an affirmative duty to instruct a jury on princi-
ples of law vital to a criminal defendant's case.29 Furthermore, in Newton
v. Commonwealth,"0 the Virginia Court of Appeals approved the granting
of an instruction based entirely upon a procedural statute."1 Batts and
Newton reflect the Court of Appeals's concern that jury instructions be
accurate and directive as to matters of law affecting a defendant's case. Both
cases offer a basis on which to assert that under Virginia law, an instruction
on the consequences of deadlock is a correct statement of law necessary to
a jury's sentencing determination and is proper notwithstanding the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Jones.32
B. Review oflury Instructions
Based upon the instructions and the decision forms issued, Jones
asserted that the jury was led to believe that its failure to reach a unanimous
sentence recommendation would result in the court imposing a sentence less
severe than life imprisonment." Jones argued that (1) sentences cannot be
based on materially untrue assumptions, (2) the jury is entitled to accurate
sentencing information, and (3) jury confusion constitutes an arbitrary
factor warranting reversal of his sentence under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the FDPA3
1. Scope ofReview
Because the Supreme Court determined that Jones had not properly
presented and preserved his objection to the jury instructions and decision
forms, the court limited its review to a plain error analysis.3" The Court
pointed to both statutory law36 and case law3 7 and firmly asserted that
objections raised after the jury retires fail to preserve such objections.3 ,
Likewise, the court noted that proposing an instruction before the jury
28. Batts v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 307, 312 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
29. Id. (quoting Jiminez v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 678, 681 (Va. 1991)).
30. 512 S.E.2d 846 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
31. Newton v. Commonwealth, 512 S.E.2d 846, 857 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
32. Section 19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code provides that the court will impose a
sentence of life imprisonment in the event of a jury's failure to reach unanimity in sentenc-
ing. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1999).
33. Jones, 119 S.Ct. at 2100.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2102.
36. SeeFED. R. CRIM. P.30.;FED.R. CFM. P. 1,54(a); 18 U.S.C. S 3595(c)(2)(C) (1999).
37. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 38 (1965); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 436 (1963).
38. Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 2101.
[Vol. 12:1
JONES V UNITED STATES
retires does not present a proper objection to the instructions actually
issued.3
Jones also advanced the argument that the FDPA creates an exception
that requires review of death sentences imposed under an arbitrary factor,
thus entitling him to a resentencing despite his having defaulted the claim.'
The Court, asserting that the FDPA exhibited clear legislative intent to
impose a timely objection requirement, rejected Jones's reading of the
FDPA as overbroad."
2. Plain Error Review
In review for plain error, relief is justified upon a finding of error that
is plain and affects substantial rights. 2 The Court uses plain error review
sparingly, reserving it to correct only errors said to "seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."43
Jones's argument failed to clear even the first hurdle as the Court found
that no error had occurred." Rejecting a request for the lenient standard set
forth in Andres v. United States,"s the Court reaffirmed Boyde v. California
6
as establishing the single standard for reviewing whether jury instructions
were applied unconstitutionally. The Boyde standard asks whether a reason-
able likelihood existed that the jury applied the disputed instruction in
violation of the United States Constitution."'
The Court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the
jury misapplied the instructions because the district court did not expressly
inform the jury that it would impose a lesser sentence in the case of dead-
lock. Nor did the district court expressly require the jury to choose the
verdict form that recommended a lesser sentence in the event it failed to
reach an agreement." The Court did concede that the verdict forms stand-
ing alone could have led the jury to believe that a lack of unanimity would
result in a sentence less than life. However, the Court concluded that any
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2102.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,467 (1997) (quoting United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993))).
43. Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. at 2103-04.
45. 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
46. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
47. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990).




confusion caused by the forms was alleviated when considered in the full
context of the jury instructions.50
Somewhat alarming was the Court's determination that even if an error
had occurred, Jones would have been unable to prove that his substantial
rights were affected. Because the district court warned the jury not to be
concerned with the effect of a lesser sentence recommendation, a presump-
tion arose that the jurors followed those instructions."1 The Court went
further to state that Jones could not have shown that any confusion had
been detrimental since the effect of the confusion was uncertain. 2 The
Court arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding two juror affidavits pre-
pared post-sentence; the Court, citing procedural deficiencies, refused to
review them." These actions seem to leave defense attorneys at a loss as to
what evidence can ever defeat a presumption that jurors followed instruc-
tions.
C. Constitutional Validity of Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors
In addition to the requisite statutory factors on which Jones's death
sentence was substantiated, the jury also found two non-statutory aggravat-
ing factors based on victim impact and victim vulnerability evidence.-s
Jones contended that the non-statutory factors submitted to the jury were
impermissibly duplicative, vague, and overbroad in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 5 The Fifth Circuit agreed with Jones, but found that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' Four Supreme Court
Justices did not find the non-statutory aggravating factors duplicative, vague
or overbroad, and therefore upheld them as constitutionally valid. 7 The
Court identified the only potential error to be one of drafting, which it
found to be harmless. 8
1. Duplicative Factors Analysis
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the non-statutory aggravating factors
were duplicative because the plain meaning of the term "personal character-
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2105.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2104 n.11.
54. Id. at 2097.
55. Id. at 2105.
56. Id. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 250-252.
57. Jones, 119 S.Ct at 2107-08.
58. Id. at 2109-10. The Court opined that, assuming the nonstatutory aggravating
factors were poorly written, the prosecution's argument served to clarify any confusion and,
had the factors been drafted more precisely, the jury would have still reached the same
conclusion. Id.
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istics" used in 3(C) of the Special Findings Form also encompassed the traits
which the jury considered in 3(B). s9 The court ruled that the duplication led
to double counting of aggravating factors which skewed the weighing
process and resulted in a risk of an arbitrary death sentence. 
6
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. The Court has never
held, and refused to hold in Jones, that duplicative factors are necessarily
constitutionally invalid.61 Instead, the Court asserted that the weighing
process is skewed when the jury has considered an invalid factor.62 The
Court further dismissed the Fifth Circuit's "double counting" theory by
declaring that the phrase "personal characteristics" is more naturally read as
referring to the victim's character and personality, as opposed to physical
characteristics.6 ' The evidence of the victim's vulnerability and uniqueness,
the Court reasoned, was relevant to different aggravating factors. 64 Further-
more, any risk of skewing was eradicated by the government's urging to the
jury that the evidence went to two entirely different areas, as well as the trial
court's instruction that factors should be weighed qualitatively rather than
quantitatively.5
2. Vagueness Analysis
The Fifth Circuit found that the non-statutory aggravating factors were
unconstitutionally vague, as they were ill-defined and failed to guide or limit
jury discretion.' Again, the Supreme Court disagreed.67 When examining
eligibility and selection factors for vagueness, the detection of bias or capri-
ciousness controls." The Court's self-described deferential review deems an
aggravating factor constitutional so long as its core meaning is comprehensi-
59. The non-statutory aggravating factors found on the Special Findings Form read:
3B). Tracie Joy McBride's youngage, her slight stature, her background, and her
uifamiliarity with San Angelo, Texas.
3(C). Tracie Joy McBride's personal characteristics and the effect of the instant
offense on Tracie Joy McBride's family constitute an aggravating factor of the
offense.
Id. at 2107.
60. Id. at 2106-07.
61. Id. at 2107.
62. Id. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992) (stating that consideration of an
invalid factor skews the weighing process).
63. Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 2107.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. SeeJones, 132 F.3d at 251.
67. Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 2107.
68. Id. at 2107-08 (citing Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994)).
1999]
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ble to juries.69 Here, the court found that the factors were clearly defined
and easily understood by the jury.7'
3. Overbroad Analysis
An aggravating factor may be overbroad where the sentencing jury
fairly concludes that an aggravating circumstance could apply to every death
eligible defendant." Despite acknowledging that victim vulnerability and
victim impact are relevant in every murder case, the Court concluded that
in any particular case, the evidence is inherently individualized and highly
relevant to the selection phase decision."2 The Court found that such was
true in this case because the factors directed the jury to evidence specific to
the case. 3
Latanya R. White
69. Id. at 2108.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993)).
72. Id. See Tuiaepa, 512 U.S. at 976.
73. Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 2108.
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